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Abstract 
Equality of opportunity is a political ideal which requires that ex-ante inequalities, and only those inequalities, should 
be eliminated. Justice requires leveling the playing field by rendering everyone's opportunities equal in an appropriate 
sense, and then letting individual choices and their effects dictate further outcomes. In this paper we propose a 
methodology to decompose the path-independent Atkinson index of equality through Shapley value seeking for a 
measure of overall inequality produced by the marginal contributions of the opportunity and the responsibility 
component.
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     1 Introduction
According to the principle of equality of opportunity (EOp, hereafter), a
distribution among individuals is fair if only if it requires that unchosen
inequalities should be eliminated and that inequalities that arise from the
choices of individuals, given equal initial conditions, should not be elimi-
nated or reduced. So far as the Western European tradition is concerned, a
society should split equally the means to reach a valuable outcome among
its members. Once the set of opportunities have been equalized, which par-
ticular opportunity, the individual chooses from those open to her, is outside
the scope of justice. Ex ante inequalities, and only those inequalities, should
be eliminated or compensated for by public intervention.
This note represents an attempt to decompose the well-de￿ned Shap-
ley decomposition in accordance with the equality of opportunity principle.
The procedure is developed by taking into account the "path independent
property" of the multiplicative measures expressed in equality terms. Partic-
ularly, we characterize a shapley-value decomposition of the Atkinson index
of equality with the aversion parameter ￿ = 1 into an "opportunity" and a
"responsibility" part. With the help of an illustration, we show that the mar-
ginal contributions produced by these two components perfectly correspond
to the measurement of overall inequality in the society.
Section 2 de￿nes the equality of opportunity model taken out from Per-
agine (2004) while section 3 reorganizes the modi￿ed shapley procedure in
equality terms. Finally, the application of this methodology measuring equal-
ity of opportunity is proposed in section 4. Concluding remarks follow in
section 5.
2 The model1
Given a society composed by N individuals, each individual income is a
joint result of circumstances and e⁄ort. We de￿ne the circumstances as all
factors for which individuals do not have control, belonging to a ￿nite set
￿ = fT1;:::;Tj;:::;Tmg, with j￿j = m. Instead, e⁄ort variable summarizes all
factors for which individuals have some responsibility, denoted by a variable
E 2 ￿. The value of the e⁄ort level E is not observable. Formally, individual
1This model is taken out from Peragine (2004).
1income is generated by a function g : ￿￿￿ ! <+ that assigns each individual
income to combinations of e⁄ort E and circumstance T:
y = g(T;E) (1)
Given the ordering de￿ned over ￿, we can partition any population into m
subgroups, each one identi￿ed by a variable Tj 2 ￿ = fT1;:::;Tj;:::;Tmg. For
each Tj 2 ￿, we call ￿ type-j￿the set of individuals whose set of circumstances
is Tj. Let NY












+ , the type-j
income distribution. Therefore, for the overall income pro￿le Y 2 <NY
+ , we











~ y1;:::;~ yj;:::;~ ym
￿
where ￿yj is the mean income of the type-j vector, 1Nj is the unit vector
of size Nj and the individual income ~ yj is obtained by rescaling each type-j
income vector as









where ￿ is the mean income of the overall income pro￿le Y 2 <NY
+ .
In this case, (a) is the overall vector of income pro￿le, (b) eliminates the
equality within-types and (c) eliminates the between-types equality. On one
side, this means that by measuring the equality in the smoothed distribution
(YB), obtained by replacing each income i with its type mean income ￿yj, we
capture only and fully the between-types equality, which, in turn, in the type
approach re￿ ects the equality of opportunity. On the other side by rescaling
all type distributions until all types have the same mean income, we are left
2This procedure identi￿es a methodology called the type approach proposed by Peragine
(2004). It focus on ex-ante inequalities between individuals with the same circumstances.
2with an income pro￿le (YW) which express the equality within-types. This
can be interpreted as equality due to individual responsibility.
Measuring equality of opportunity through these two distributions (b)
and (c) leads to di⁄erent evaluations for almost all indices used in the in-
come inequality literature. Instead, Lasso de La Vega and Urrutia (2005)
introduce the ￿path-independent decomposable￿class of multiplicative in-
dices for which the two pro￿les (directly or indirectly computed) yield the
same results. This class reduces to a single measure of equality when the cho-
sen reference income is the arithmetic mean, i.e., the Atkinson index EA with





3 Shapley decomposition in equality terms
The application of the Shapley value algorithm to decompose inequality and
poverty measures into between- and within- parts has been proposed by
Shorrocks (1999) and by Chantreuil and Trannoy (1999) and Sastre and
Trannoy (2002) for inequality measures, while a Shapley decomposition by
income sources was provided by Fournier (1999). The Shapley value is a
solution concept ￿rst employed in game theory with the aim to divide a
given surplus among members of a coalition.
We propose a modi￿ed application of the Shapley value which takes into
account a multiplicative class of indices expressed in equality terms. Partic-
ularly, due to the equality of opportunity model suggested in the previous
section, we focus on the path independent Atkinson index of equality EA
taking into account vj income-types, 8j 2 ￿ = f1;:::;mg which can be ex-
pressed as:
EA = EA [v1;:::;vj;:::;vm] (3)
The decomposition principle consists in assigning contribution Cj to each
one of the variable vj, 8j 2 ￿ = f1;:::;mg, allowing the EA variable to be
3A proof of the path-independent decomposition of the Atkinson index with the aversion
parameter ￿ = 1 is proposed in the appendix.
3expressed as the sum of the factor contributions. Each contribution refers
to the marginal impact when all possible elimination tracks are taken into
account. We de￿ne EA (S) where S = ￿nfvjg as the value of the index
of equality when the factor vj has been dropped. The Shapley procedure
considers the elimination of all possible variables. Therefore, in a recursively
way, the set S is the domain of variables remaining after the Shapley process
of elimination has been developed and s is its cardinality, i.e., the number
of variables remaining after the successive eliminations. The contribution of
the j-variable to the inequality index is given by:
Cj(￿;I) =
￿ ￿





s!(m ￿ s ￿ 1)!
m!
[EA (S [ fvjg) ￿ EA (S)]
￿





Cj(￿;I) = IA = (1 ￿ EA ) (5)
where IA is the Atkinson index of inequality. As proposed above in the
computation of the Atkinson index of equality through the Shapley proce-
dure, we assume that all mean incomes in the smoothed distribution (YB) are
di⁄erent between each other. To express the equality between types, we liken










regards instead the equality within types, a comparison is developed between
the distribution in which the individual incomes within a speci￿c type di⁄er
from the mean income (yij 6= ￿j) and the distribution where all incomes of
the type are equal (yij = ￿j)4.
4Such decomposition refers to the case of homogenous type partitions. The hetero-
geneous case can be developed adding the marginal contributions suggested by di⁄erent
sizes between types. If instead, we consider the possibility of heterogeneous partition,
then the impact of di⁄erences in size must be analyzed. In the latter case the analysis
further requires the comparison among the situation in which the types have di⁄erent
sizes (sj 6= 1=m), 8j 2 f1;:::;mg, to the case where all types have the same dimension
(sj = 1=m).
44 Measuring equality of opportunity
Let us take as a simple illustration the case where there are six individual
incomes (2;8;16;30;40;60), where type A includes the incomes (8;16;60)
and type B (2;30;40). The mean income of type A is 28 and that of type
B is 24. The average income ￿ in this population is 26. Such analysis is
characterized by 4 steps.
1) Applying the Shapley value on the income pro￿le representation in the
type strategy, we look at the reference income vectors showed in the previous
section. Starting by the overall income vector Y = fy1;:::;yj;::;ymg; we can
express EA(￿j 6= ￿; yij 6= ￿j) as the overall Atkinson index of equality. It









. It follows that:
























where ￿yj1Nj is the mean income of the type-j income vector. EA(￿j 6= ￿;
yij = ￿j) re￿ ects the equality in the distribution where the within-types
equality has been eliminated and the mean incomes of the types are di⁄er-
5ent5.




















3)In this step, we compute the Atkinson index of equality for the income
pro￿le YW =
￿
~ y1;:::;~ yj;:::;~ ym
￿
. EA(￿j = ￿;yij 6= ￿j) refers to the case
where there is within-types equality. In this case, the mean type incomes are





8j ￿f1;:::;mg; 8h ￿f1;:::;Njg6:
EA(￿j = ￿;yij 6= ￿j) = EA ((2 ￿ 26=24);(8 ￿ 26=28);:::) =
5It is interesting to point out that we obtain the same result if we directly apply to the
income pro￿le YB, the between-group component EB
A derived from the path independent






















6The same result is obtained if we directly apply to the income pro￿le YW, the within-
group component EW
A derived from the path independent multiplicative decomposition of


































































4)As a last step, we compute EA(￿j = ￿;yij = ￿j) represents the pro￿le
where the individual incomes within a given type are equal. In this case it
is also assumed that the mean incomes of the di⁄erent types are equal. It
should then be clear that in this distribution all the incomes are equal to the
overall mean income such that:




















According to the Shapley value, let us now compute the contributions to





















f[0;6251 ￿ 0;997] + [0;626 ￿ 1]g
￿ ￿
￿ ￿ = 0;37295 (10)
This represents the impact of equality in the within component of the













EA(￿j 6= ￿;yij = ￿j) ￿ EA(￿j = ￿;yij = ￿)
￿






f[0;6251 ￿ 0;626] + [0;997 ￿ 1]g
￿ ￿
￿ ￿ = 0;00195 (11)
Summing eq. (10) and eq. (11), the overall impacts of equality will be
equal to:
CWtype + CBtype = 0;37295 + 0;00195 = 0;3749 (12)
7which perfectly corresponds to the Atkinson index of inequality IA =
(1 ￿ EA) such that:
IA = (1 ￿ EA) = (1 ￿ 0;6251) = 0;3749 (13)
5 Concluding remarks
In this paper we provide an application of the Shapley-value procedure in
accordance with the equality of opportunity principle. In the case of de-
composition by population subgroups, we focus on the between- and within-
components which refer to the opportunity and the responsibility factors di-
rectly computed. Rather di⁄erent than the traditional decomposition, the
opportunity egalitarian decomposition using the Shapley value produces dif-
ferent marginal contributions between- and within- types. Summing up these
two contributions perfectly re￿ ect the overall inequality in the society. This
clearly represents a simpli￿cation of the model in the homogenous type case.
Further development in this direction can be addressed taking into account
di⁄erences in size among types. Some extensions in these directions can be
left for future research.
8A The Appendix
On the basis of the "path-independent decomposable￿class of multiplicative
equality measures suggested by Lasso de La Vega and Urrutia (2005), it











A be the between-group component which can be interpreted as the











where pj = Nj=N is the population share. Hence, we de￿ne the Atkinson￿ s


























































9By construction, the within part of the Atkinson index of equality is

































[1] Atkinson, A.B. (1970), "On the measurement of inequality", Journal of
Economic Theory, 2, 244￿ 263
[2] Blackorby, C., Donaldson D., Auersperg M. (1981), "A new procedure
for the measurement of inequality within and among population sub-
groups", Canadian Journal of Economics, 14, 665￿ 685
[3] Chantreuil, F., and Trannoy, A. (1999), ￿Inequality Decomposition Val-
ues: The Trade-o⁄ Between Marginality and Consistency￿ , Working
Paper 9924, THEMA.
[4] Checchi, D. and Peragine, V. (2009), "Inequality of opportunity in
Italy", Journal of Economic Inequality, forthcoming
[5] Cowell, F.A. (2000), "Measurement of inequality". In: Atkinson, A.B.,
Bourguignon, F. (eds.) Handbook of Income Distribution, pp. 87￿ 166.
North-Holland, Amsterdam, The Netherlands
[6] Deutsch, J. and J. Silber (1999), "Inequality Decomposition by Popu-
lation Subgroups and the Analysis of Interdistributional Inequality", in
J. Silber, editor, Handbook on Income Inequality Measurement, Kluwer
Academic Press, Dordrecht and Boston, 363-397.
[7] Foster, J., Shneyerov, A. (1999), "A general class of additively decom-
posable inequality measures", Economic Theory, 14, 89￿ 111
[8] Foster, J., Shneyerov, A. (2000), "Path independent inequality mea-
sures". Journal of Economic Theory, 91, 199￿ 222
[9] Lasso de la Vega, C., Urrutia, A. (2003), "A new factorial decomposition
for the Atkinson measure", Economics Bulletin, 4 (29), 1￿ 12
[10] Lasso de la Vega, C., Urrutia, A. (2005), "Path independent multiplica-
tively decomposable inequality measures", Investigaciones. Economicas,
XXIX(2), 379￿ 387
[11] Peragine V. (2004), ￿Measuring and implementing equality of opportu-
nity for income￿ , Social Choice and Welfare, 22, 1-24
11[12] Roemer, J.E. (1998), Equality of opportunity, Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press.
[13] Sastre M. and A. Trannoy (2002), ￿Shapley inequality decomposition
by factor components: Some methodological issues￿ , in P. Moyes, C.
Seidl and A.F. Shorrocks (eds.), Inequalities: Theory, Experiments and
Applications, Journal of Economics, 9, 51-90
[14] Shorrocks, A.F. (1984), "Inequality decomposition by factor compo-
nents", Econometrica, 50, 193-211
[15] Shorrocks, A.F. (1984), "Inequality decomposition by population sub-
groups", Econometrica, 52, 1369￿ 1385
[16] Silber, J., (1989), "Factors Components, Population Subgroups and the
Computation of the Gini Index of Inequality", The Review of Economics
and Statistics, LXXI:107-115.
12